Abstract A linear order is n-decidable if its universe is N and the relations determined by n formulas are uniformly computable. This means that there is a computable procedure which, when applied to a n formula ϕ(x) and a sequenceā of elements of the linear order, will determine whether or not ϕ(ā) is true in the structure. A linear order is decidable if the relations determined by all formulas are uniformly computable. These definitions suggest two questions. Are there, for each n, n-decidable linear orders that are not (n + 1)-decidable? Are there linear orders that are ndecidable for all n but not decidable? The former was answered in t he positive by Moses in 1993. Here we answer the latter, also positively.
Introduction
The study of computable algebraic structures has a long and by now widely known history. Beginning in the "finitistic" demands of the algebraists of the late 1800s and early 1900s, it hit its stride in the papers of Fröhlich and Shepherdson [4] and Rabin [7] which set the tone for much of what was to follow. A good introduction to such a computable analysis as applied to linear orders is provided in the final chapter of Rosenstein [8] ; a more current and comprehensive, almost encyclopedic, treatment in Downey [1] .
A linear order is computable if its universe is N (we will take this to be the case from here on) and the quantifier-free formulas uniformly denote computable relations. This means that there is a computable procedure, which when applied to a quantifier-free formula ϕ(x) and a sequenceā of elements of the linear order, will determine whether or not ϕ(ā) is true in the structure. (Quite clearly this is equivalent to demanding just that the order relation be computable.) A linear order is decidable if all formulas uniformly denote computable relations. Between these two concepts lies that of an n-decidable linear order, defined to be one in which the n formulas uniformly denote computable relations.
Moses [6] answered the first of the questions in our abstract by constructing, for each n, a linear order that is n-decidable but not (n + 1)-decidable and, in fact, has no (n + 1)-decidable copy. In this paper we answer the second by constructing a linear order that is n-decidable for all n but is not decidable and, in fact, has no decidable copy. To make the linear order n-decidable we will arrange that the n formulas uniformly denote computable relations. To ensure it has no decidable copy we will arrange that the set of sentences true in our linear order is not computable. These conflicting requirements, that truth can be effectively determined for n formulas, but that this cannot be done uniformly in n, not even for sentences, produces the tension in our construction. This paper then will be devoted to establishing the following.
Theorem 1.1
There is a linear order L that is n-decidable for all n but has no decidable copy.
Our terminology will be standard, as presented for instance in [8] , or will be obvious from the context. We will sometimes replace a sub-or superscript by the wildcard symbol * to allow easy reference to the structures denoted by the range of the sub/superscript: L * , for instance, will represent (any and every) one of
Note that we will mean L * to denote any and every one of L 1 , L 2 , . . . , L k every time we use it, that is, repeated usage, even in the same sentence, is intended to denote (possibly) different linear orders. If we wish to refer repeatedly to a specific one of them we will use the more standard L i . We mean the labels to denote (classical) order types; we will not use individual labels for the several separate copies of each order type. We believe, or at least hope, that this conservation of symbols will not cause confusion.
Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games
We extend the notation L 1 ≡ L 2 (elementary equivalence) to L 1 ≡ n L 2 , meaning that the two linear orders satisfy the same n sentences. To establish L 1 ≡ n L 2 we will use a modification of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games: consider a two-person game played on the linear orders L 1 and L 2 by the players P1 and P2. Two numbers are set before the game begins: n, the number of moves each player will make, and k, whose usage will be described below. The players will move in turn, with P1 playing first. At each move P1 will select a sequence of at most k elements wholly contained in either one of the linear orders and P2 will select a sequence of the same length in the other. P2's aim is to arrange that the (finite) suborder of L 1 that consists of all the elements selected so far (by P1 and P2) is isomorphic to the corresponding set of elements in L 2 via the mapping that identifies the sequences chosen by the two players at each move. If P2 is able to match P1's choice for n moves, extending the isomorphism to include the new sequence each time, we say P2 has won the n-k E-F Game; otherwise P1 is the victor.
Note that the number of moves and the maximum length of the sequences selected at each move are established in advance. Notice also that the sequence P1 selects may come from either linear order and that P2's sequence must produce an isomorphism that extends the existing isomorphism. The original Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games, introduced implicitly in Fraïssé [3] and explicitly in Ehrenfeucht [2] , and applied extensively to linear orders in [8] , is the restriction of our games caused by fixing k at 1. The obvious modification of the arguments presented there establish that
Allow us to reiterate: the relation ≡ n , corresponding to our version of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé Games, is different from the usual one, most often denoted ∼ n , which, in our notation, would require only that P2 can win every n-1 E-F Game, and implies only that L 1 and L 2 satisfy the same sentences of quantifier depth n. This is not strong enough for our purposes.
Shuffles
is the linear order produced by partitioning η, the dense linear order without endpoints, into k subsets each of which is dense in η, and replacing each point in the ith of these subsets with a copy of L i .
We will construct our linear order L as the limit of a sequence of linear orders Since we intend to construct a linear order with certain computable properties, we need to describe our construction in some detail. We will build each
in such a way that we will keep careful track of which elements of N are used in which copy of L * i−1 , where these elements lie within their separate L * i−1 's (i.e., with respect to the linear orders of which the L * i−1 is a shuffle) and where these separate L * i−1 's lie with respect to each other. There are several ways of performing such a construction. We describe one: clearly we can construct a copy of L 0 with the required properties. Assuming that we can perform such constructions for all the
by first laying down copies of the L * i−1 's with the required properties, in order (any order will do, we choose the obvious one), to form the sum
At each further stage we lay down several such sums, one between each adjacent pair of existing L * i−1 's, one to the extreme left and one to the extreme right. It should be clear that we can mesh the construction of the separate copies of the L * i−1 's in such a way that we know exactly where each element of the universe N lies with respect to the particular L * i−1 in which it lies, and with respect to the linear order within that L * i−1
(one of those shuffled to produce that L * i−1 ) in which it lies (and, in fact, with respect to the linear order within that, and within that, all the way down to the copy of 1, 2, 3, or 4 in which this element lies). We will see that this will allow us to show that L, the linear order constructed by this infinite process, will be n-decidable for every n.
Note that each of our L i has a decidable copy. One way to see this is to observe that L i can be defined, up to isomorphism, by a (first-order) sentence. The sentence
would say that each element lies within a closed interval [x, y] isomorphic to one of the (finitely many) L * i−1 's, and that to the left of this interval and to its right and between it and every interval isomorphic to a different L * i−1 , there lie intervals isomorphic to each one of the L * i−1 's. We can write this as a sentence in the language of linear order by incorporating sentences that define the L * i−1 's. That this sentence defines the linear order up to isomorphism can be seen via a Cantor back-and-forth argument. Since the theory of linear orders is decidable, it follows that Th(L i ) is computable, and hence (by the Henkin construction, which is algorithmic) has a decidable model which must be isomorphic to L i (since it satisfies the defining sentence).
We will show that L is n-decidable by providing a computable procedure which, when applied to any sequenceā in L, will produce a sequenceb in the decidable copy of L n which satisfies there precisely the same n formulas thatā satisfies in L. Since the copy of L n is decidable, this will imply that L is n-decidable.
To guarantee that L has no decidable copy we will make Th shuffled in will allow us to make this switch at any time. In this manner we put the ith computably enumerable function out of the running as a possible enumerator of Th(L). This strategy of ours, when employed against an L i , will cause us to change
, and consequently change every L j with j > i, and consequently change their defining sentences ψ j . Even if we have already acted against these L j , we will need to reconsider them and perhaps act against them again once the jth computably enumerable function has made up its mind on the truth, in L, of the new defining sentence ψ j , whence the (finite) injury in our construction.
Notice that this does not jeopardize our strategy for ensuring that L be ndecidable: for a given n we just have to guess at a stage when L 1 , . . . , L n have all settled down (between being L − * or L + * ); we can then use the decidable copy of that L n (which will never again be tampered with) to provide a decision procedure for the n formulas in L. It is the uniformity, over n, of these decisions, that we will have impaired.
ing defined L i−1 to be a linear order of the form 1 + σ(
we define L i as follows:
and
The number k will depend on how many switches have been made from L − * to L + * ; k may be as few as 3 and as many as i + 3. Base step (i = 1): take ϕ j 1 to be the 3 sentence that says there is no "maximal block" of size j (i.e., j consecutive elements, the first of which has no immediate predecessor, the last of which has no immediate successor).
Inductive step: take ϕ Since this sentence speaks of the nonexistence, in L j i , of an interval of a certain type, the fact that it is false in every one of the other L * i 's will make it false in every shuffle of these other L * i 's, and in every shuffle of those shuffles, and so on. Consider now the sentence saying that, for each pair x, y, the interval [x, y] is not isomorphic to L s. This will also be true of the corresponding interval for P1's sequence; that is, that sequence also will be of the form α + β 1 + β 2 + β 3 + γ, with the five summands as described. Since the two α's and the two γ's will be isomorphic, and for each j, the two β j 's will, by the inductive hypothesis, be ≡ i−1 , it follows that P2 can beat P1 at every (i − 1)-k E-F Game played within these two intervals.
This, and the fact that each L i has a decidable copy, allows us to show that L is idecidable for each i: consider any sequenceā in L. Wait for a stage j ≥ i by which a has been enumerated into the construction and lies wholly within some copy of L j , and further still, for a stage when
. This latter stage cannot be recognized during the construction (this is where the nonuniformity comes in: our algorithm for i is predicated on guessing such a stage). Our construction allows us to determine exactly how the elements ofā lie within their copies of L * i 's. Find a sequenceb in the decidable copy of L i with its elements in the same situation with respect to order L so produced is n-decidable for every n. It has no decidable copy since the set of sentences true in L is not computable: the eth computably enumerable function could not possibly denote exactly which sentences were true in L since, if it were the first computably enumerable function on the list to do so, there would come a stage in the construction after which none of the earlier computably enumerable functions are ever addressed (and hence ψ e would never change), when e would both require attention and may be addressed, and consequently would be, thus causing it to be in error on the truth in L of the sentence ψ e . This completes the proof of our theorem.
6
Intrinsically n-decidable It should be noted that the linear order we have constructed does have computable copies that are not n-decidable for all n, in fact, computable copies that are not even 1-decidable. It follows from the characterization of intrinsically 1-decidable linear orders (i.e., 1-decidable linear orders all of whose computable copies are also 1-decidable) in Moses [5] that every such linear order is decidable. So there is no linear order that is n-decidable for all n and intrinsically n-decidable for all n but has no decidable copy.
Consider, however, the language of linear order expanded by adding a constant symbol for each element of the L we constructed and the structure M in this language produced from L by interpreting each constant symbol by the corresponding element. It is clear from our construction of L that Th(M ) is noncomputable whereas for each n, the set of n sentences true in M is computable. It follows that M has no decidable copy but is n-decidable for all n, and intrinsically so (every element in a computable copy of M will be a constant and hence, for every n formula ϕ and sequenceā in that copy, ϕ(ā) will be a n sentence in the language). We have established the following.
Corollary 6.1
There is a structure that is n-decidable and intrinsically n-decidable for all n but has no decidable copy.
We do not know whether there is a more natural structure with this property; Chisholm can show that there is no tree.
